As the debate over same-sex “marriage” continues on the Australian political scene, Australian Family Association (AFA) Victorian president TERRI KELLEHER and AFA Queensland spokesman LUKE McCORMACK offers an opinion piece that is in accord with Church teachings
WESTERN democracies face an unprecedented push to redefine marriage to include homosexual couples.
Internationally this push has been successful in a small number of jurisdictions (as at March 2011, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, South Africa, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, Denmark and Argentina endorse marriage between two persons of the same sex at a federal level), but has been rejected (usually by popular vote) in many more.
For example, in 100 per cent of state referenda in the USA redefinition of marriage has been rejected, that is 32 out of 32 states.
Without calling it “marriage”, homosexual-rights lobbyists in Australia have successfully won campaigns to have state governments give marriage-like formal legal recognition to homosexual unions by using the terms such as “relationship registers”, “civil unions” or “civil partnerships”.
These legal instruments have the same fundamental effect of marriage law by giving formal recognition to a sexual union of two adults, traditionally only reserved for marriage.
Proponents of “homosexual marriage” typically frame the issue as a matter of civil rights, (unjust) discrimination, and equality before the law.
Defending marriage is both reasonable, and entirely compatible with equality and justice.
It is because of its natural orientation to conception that heterosexual unions merit special recognition.
Viewed as a social and legal signifier of the heterosexual union’s unique, life-generating character, it is unsurprising that marriage should be understood by most people as being uniquely linked to children.
A definition of marriage which included homosexual couples would destroy this link.
Importantly, the association between marriage and children is not diminished by specific instances of infertility in heterosexual couples.
These are properly regarded as exceptions to the rule, and do not detract from the inherent life-generating capacity which distinguishes heterosexual unions from all other kinds of sexual union.
Once new life has been formed, the child naturally has a profound, lifelong interest in the quality of the relationship between his or her mother and father, and in that relationship being characterised by the qualities of lifelong, exclusive fidelity.
The permanent marital commitment provides the requisite stability and longevity for the rearing of children to maturity.
When this permanence is coupled with a commitment of exclusive fidelity, the natural result is for the family – mother, father and their children – to remain a united whole.
Although the family takes many forms in contemporary Australian society, it is uncontroversial to insist that the ideal family environment is that in which children are raised by their own mother and father.
According to a 2004 study, 73.6 per cent of children under 18 in Australia live with their biological parents in intact families.
The institution of marriage is instrumental in realising this ideal, by binding a man, a woman, and their biological children in a stable family unit.
This ideal may be contrasted with the reality of child-rearing within homosexual relationships, where any children are, by necessity, not being raised by at least one of their biological parents.
The proliferation of artificial reproductive technologies (ARTs) has already gone some way to undermining the importance of a child’s connection with his or her biological parents, with often-traumatic repercussions for donor-conceived persons.
Redefining marriage to include homosexual couples would accelerate the process, by nullifying the institution’s function of preserving the unity of the biological family.
It is important to note that although homosexual parenting deprives children of the right to be raised by their biological parents, this does not mean that women in a lesbian relationship, or men in a homosexual relationship, cannot be good parents.
But it is also true that a woman can only be mother, and not a father; and that a man can only be a father, not a mother; and it has been convincingly argued that to voluntarily and unnecessarily deprive a child of either a mother or a father is contrary to the child’s fundamental rights and best interests.
We suggest that the state bears a positive obligation to safeguard the rights of children by encouraging exclusivity and permanence among those relationships which are inherently predisposed to creating new life.
It has been suggested that this extends beyond a mere obligation to safeguard the child’s developmental wellbeing, but also includes an obligation to protect the child’s right not to be separated from his or her biological parents.
Marriage is the chief instrument by which the state fulfils this obligation, fostering permanence and exclusivity within the only kind of relationship which is inherently predisposed to creating children: the comprehensive heterosexual union.
It is important to note that marriage comprises an entirely exceptional instance of state intervention in personal relationships.
It is not normal for the state to regulate intimate relationships, and given the inherently fraught nature of the marital commitment, one might expect the state to remain impartial.
And yet the state does become involved, even impressing upon the marrying couple the grave responsibility of honouring their commitment of lifelong, exclusive fidelity.
Section 46 of the Marriage Act requires a marriage celebrant to warn the marrying couple “… of the solemn and binding nature of the relationship into which you are now about to enter.”
For the state to place such expectations on a marrying couple seems wildly out of step with contemporary notions of individual liberty. Such an extraordinary intervention demands justification.
However, the unique link between the elements of permanence and exclusivity in marriage, and the social stability and economic benefits of children being reared in the optimum environment for healthy development, each provide strong grounds for the state becoming involved in the regulation of relationships which are of a life-generating nature.
In the absence of this unique interest, any insistence by the state upon permanence and exclusive fidelity in private relationships seems unwarranted.
Unjust discrimination is alleged in two ways.
Firstly, it is said that the law unfairly discriminates by preventing homosexual couples from marrying on the basis of their sexual orientation.
However, this assertion blithely assumes that the sex of the spouses is not relevant in determining what does or does not constitute “marriage”. That is, the assertion begs the very question in issue.
If the sex of the spouses is determinative of whether a relationship can be marital – much as the sex of a man is determinative of whether or not he can be a mother – then allegations that the legal definition of marriage is unjustly discriminatory are as nonsensical as alleging that a definition of motherhood, which excludes men, is unjustly discriminatory.
If, as we have argued, marriage relates specifically to heterosexual unions, it follows that any relationship which does not meet this criterion simply is not marriage.
Secondly, current marriage law is said to be unfairly discriminatory because couples who cannot marry are precluded from certain marital benefits, relating to such matters as inheritance, taxation, superannuation, medical decision making powers, and being nominated as next of kin.
However these benefits are relevant to other types of co-dependent relationships and arrangements (for example, the relationship between a disabled or infirm person and his or her carer), and can be – and for the most part have been – dealt with by specific legislation.
Since they do not arise only in relation to couple relationships, they cannot be said to be of the essence of marriage.
Obviously instances of unjust exclusion from certain services or benefits must be remedied.
The point here is not to argue whether it is good public policy to extend marital benefits to other forms of co-dependent relationships, but rather to point out that justice in relation to these matters can and should be achieved through means other than radically redefining marriage, which is an important social and legal institution in its own right.
Resisting the push for “homosexual marriage” law does not rely on religious arguments alone.
Redefining marriage would remove it from the only context in which its essential features make sense. However, popular such a move might be, this would be contrary to the common good, and the antithesis of good public policy.
Although public policy should not disregard the desires or needs of individuals, it must primarily serve the common good.
Marriage law does so by fortifying that unique relationship which is naturally oriented towards bringing forth children.
Redefining marriage would undermine the very significance of the indelible biological bond between man, woman and child.
At a time when family dislocation weighs with increasing severity on families, we need public policy which reinforces, rather than undermines, the importance of mums and dads sticking together in a spirit of service to one another, to their children, and to the communities in which they live.
Queensland’s civil partnerships (now “registered relationships”) law mimics federal marriage law. It should be repealed in total.
